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I. Introduction
The Hart and Miller Islands controversy of the late 1970s and early 1980s stemmed from
an issue that has plagued the Port of Baltimore since its earliest days. The port and its
connecting channels in the Chesapeake Bay have needed constant dredging to deepen and
maintain shipping channels for ever larger cargo vessels. In generations past, the dredged spoil
was simply dumped into other areas of the Chesapeake, but conservationists had begun to argue
in the 1960s that it was environmentally irresponsible to dump contaminated spoil from
Baltimore Harbor and its industrial surroundings.
Heeding the conservationists’ warnings, the Maryland General Assembly in 1975
prohibited unconfined disposal of spoil from Baltimore Harbor into the open waters of the Bay.
Dredge spoil from the Harbor was then placed on onshore tracts of land, but this proved to be
expensive and unmanageable as available onshore land became scarcer. Meanwhile, there was a
plan to deepen the Harbor and connecting channels from 42 feet to 50 feet, which would
generate about 52 million cubic yards of spoil. It was decided that the most environmentally and
legally sound way to dispose of this spoil involved the construction of a 1,110-acre diked
disposal area on Hart and Miller Islands.
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Environmental groups and nearby residents resisted this project by filing a lawsuit to
prevent construction of this disposal facility.1 Although their resistance originated from the
potential environmental damage that the diked disposal area would cause, they based their legal
claims on the narrow interpretation of various statutes and regulations pertaining to the project,
which ultimately proved unsuccessful. The litigation caused the project to be delayed for many
years and made it more costly. Today, Hart-Miller Island continues to receive spoil from
dredging to maintain the 50-foot deep channels, and ironically, part of the island has been
converted to a state park that attracts wildlife and recreationists.

II. Background
A. Chesapeake Bay and Early Dredging
The Chesapeake Bay is the largest estuary in the United States. It extends about 200
miles from the Susquehanna River in the north to the Virginia Capes in the south before opening
into the Atlantic Ocean. Its width varies from 3.4 miles near Aberdeen, Maryland to 35 miles
near the mouth of the Potomac River.2 Although the Bay is large in area, its mean depth during
the time of the Hart and Miller Islands controversy was only 28 feet, meaning that its width-todepth ratio was an astounding 3,000:1.3 This peculiar characteristic has often led people to refer
to the Bay as a “shallow pan” of water.
Because of the Bay’s lack of depth, there is a long history of dredging to deepen the
waterways for passing vessels. The first evidence of dredging is from 1783, when the Ellicott
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Hart & Miller Islands Environmental Group, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 459 F. Supp. 279 (D. Md.
1978), rev’d 621 F.2d 1281 (4th Cir. 1980), remanded to 505 F. Supp. 732 (D. Md. 1980).
2
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, General Information About the Chesapeake Bay (2006), http://www.cbf.org/site/
PageServer?pagename=exp_sub_resources_factsheets_general (last visited Jan. 4, 2008).
3
Maryland Port Administration, Dredging and Spoil Disposal Program for Baltimore Harbor 1 (Jan. 1979). The
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, supra note 2, states that the mean depth of the Bay is 21 feet.
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brothers needed ships to export flour. They used scoops and a “horse-powered windlass” to
deepen their wharf on Pratt and Light Streets.4 At that time, the water depth was nine feet at
mean high tide at the head of the harbor.5 The state assumed responsibility for dredging
Baltimore Harbor, and in 1790, the state began using a “mud machine,” which involved a horse
turning a treadmill that in turn pulled a drag bucket from the floor of the harbor.6 These
dredging projects were financed through a tax of one penny per ton of cargo entering or leaving
the harbor, which was later increased to two cents. 7
In 1827, the steam engine replaced animals in supplying horsepower to dredging
machines, and Senator Sam Smith petitioned Congress for federal help in dredging Baltimore
Harbor.8 The federal government participated in dredging efforts for the first time in 1836,9
which by this time had extended beyond Baltimore Harbor into the waters of the Chesapeake
Bay.10 With the construction of ever larger ships through the years, the Chesapeake Bay
channels became deeper and wider. Congress authorized dredging the channel to a depth of 27
feet in 1881, a depth of 37 feet in 1930, and a depth of 42 feet in 1958.11

B. Port of Baltimore
The Port of Baltimore is paradoxically both ideally and unfavorably situated. To its
advantage is the proximity of fertile soil to an expansive and protected harbor. Upon its
founding in 1706, the Port prospered with the export of grain and tobacco to the West Indies and
4

K. Mountford, “Past Is Prologue: History of Dredging Reveals Deeper Need to Understand Bay’s Bottom Line,”
Bay Journal, Jul./Aug. 2000, available at http://www.bayjournal.com/article.cfm?article=1322.
5
G. Power et al., The Real Beneficiaries Of Federal Dredging 16. There is no copyright or printing date in this
publication.
6
See picture of mud machine in appendix.
7
K. Mountford, supra note 4.
8
Id.
9
Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 363, 5 Stat. 128, 130.
10
Maryland Port Administration, supra note 3 at 2.
11
Id.
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Europe.12 After the Revolutionary War, the Port’s location 150 miles inland proved to be
advantageous with the advent of the railroads. Because Baltimore was the closest East Coast
port to the Midwest, railroads invested heavily in building a transportation network out of
Baltimore to serve the young nation’s interior.13 Today, with the prevalence of trucking,
Baltimore is within an overnight drive to two-thirds of the population of the United States, which
is probably the reason why the Port ranks first on the East Coast for roll-on/roll-off cargo.14
Yet, the Port’s geographic location can also be an obstacle to its success. Because
Baltimore is near the northern end of the Chesapeake Bay, ships must travel 150 miles from the
Bay’s opening at the Virginia Capes in order to reach the port.15 All 150 of these miles must be
dredged regularly to maintain its current depths due to the large accumulation of sediments that
settle on the floor of the Bay.16
Despite its advantages (and because of its disadvantages), Baltimore faces major
obstacles in its competition against other ports. There is stiff competition from other ports on the
East Coast, such as New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston. Competition is also fierce from the
Port of Hampton Roads, which shares the Chesapeake Bay with Baltimore as a gate to the
Atlantic Ocean. Hampton Roads is only 18 miles from the open sea while also providing rapid
access to two-thirds of the U.S. population.17 As early as in 1984, the Virginia Port Authority
launched a public relations campaign that can be encapsulated by a remark in one of its
12

Power, supra note 5 at 15; Maryland Port Administration, http://www.marylandports.com (last visited Jan. 4,
2008).
13
See Maryland Port Administration, supra note 12.
14
Id.
15
Water Resources Support Center, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Port of Baltimore, Maryland 1 (2000). There is
a shorter route of 125 miles from the Atlantic Ocean to Baltimore through the Delaware Bay and the Chesapeake
and Delaware Canal. The canal’s depth is only 35 feet, but it carries 40% of the traffic to Baltimore. Chesapeake
& Delaware Canal, http://www.nap.usace.army.mil/sb/c&d.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2008).
16
About 5 million tons of sediment (clay, sand, soil, and bits of gravel) from eroding tributaries and runoff settle in
the Chesapeake annually. K. Blankenship, “Sediment Happens: The Question Is What Are We Going To Do
About It?” Bay Journal, Jul./Aug. 2002, available at http://www.bayjournal.com/article.cfm?article=699.
17
Information on the Port of Virginia, http://www.vaports.com/AboutThePort.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2008).
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advertisements: “Every year, many hundreds of ships needlessly enter the Chesapeake Bay and
make the long trek up the Baltimore channel.”18 Today, Hampton Roads has attracted the likes
of Wal-Mart, Target, Home Depot, and Cost Plus to establish distribution facilities there,19 and
the Port of Virginia20 handles more cargo than Baltimore in total volume and in dollars.21
Along with a shorter distance to the ocean, Hampton Roads also boasts of deeper harbors.
Although 50-foot channels serve both ports, Baltimore’s deepest berth is 45 feet, compared to 50
feet at Hampton Roads. This weakness was illuminated on November 7, 2007 when the
‘Michaela’ called on the Port of Baltimore. It was the largest ship to dock in the Port’s history,
but it arrived at only one-third capacity. The 45-foot berth would have been too shallow for the
ship if it were fully loaded.22 It is estimated that deepening the berth to 50 feet would require
$100 million and at least three years, but there are currently no plans to do so.23
The state and federal governments continue to invest in dredging projects because
Maryland relies heavily on the Port of Baltimore for its economic health. More than 120,000
jobs are linked to the Port’s activities, more than $4 billion is generated annually in wages,
salaries, and business revenues, and almost $280 million is collected annually in taxes.24 The

18

A. Muscatine, “War Between Eastern Ports Heats Up: Virginia’s Hampton Roads Challenges Baltimore,”
Washington Post, Jan. 31, 1985, at A1.
19
Virginia Port Authority, Comprehensive Annual Financial Report 3 (2007), available at
http://www.vaports.com/PDF/2007_CAFR.pdf.
20
The Port of Virginia consists of the 100-mile stretch of harbor in the Port of Hampton Roads along with an inland
port in Front Royal.
21
In 2006, the Port of Virginia received more than 15 million metric tons of cargo while the Port of Baltimore
received more than 7.7 million metric tons. Under these measurements, Virginia captured 20% of the East Coast
cargo market, and Baltimore captured 10%. In terms of dollar value of total cargo, Virginia handled more than
$47 billion and Baltimore handled about $36.5 billion. Virginia Port Authority, supra note 19 at 64-66.
22
M. Schuh, “Improvements Planned To Port of Baltimore,” WJZ TV Baltimore News Broadcast, Nov. 7, 2007,
available at http://wjz.com/video/?id=32901@wjz.dayport.com.
23
A. Cahall, “Port of Baltimore Takes in Largest Ship in Its History,” Baltimore Examiner, Nov. 8, 2007 available
at http://www.marylandports.com/news/POBInTheNews.pdf. See also C. Wykoff, “Biggest Container Ship To
Ever Call On Port Of Baltimore,” WBAL Radio News Broadcast, Nov. 7, 2007, available at http://wbal.com/
news/story.asp?articleid=65374.
24
Maryland Port Administration, supra note 13.
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Port is now ranked in the top 15 nationally for overall volume and value of cargo that it handles,
and it is ranked second in imported forest products and in automobile exports.25

C. United States Army Corps of Engineers, Baltimore District
The Continental Congress created a Corps of Engineers in 1779, but it dissolved after the
Treaty of Paris had ended the Revolutionary War. In 1794, Congress organized a Corps of
Artillerists and Engineers. Congress later created in 1802 a separate Corps of Engineers and a
new military academy in West Point, New York,26 which was the only engineering school in the
country for at least twenty years.27
The role of the Corps of Engineers in the Chesapeake Bay began around this time. The
Department of War hired French engineers to supervise the fortification of Baltimore Harbor in
1794. They began by improving earthworks on Whetstone Point, which guards the fork of the
Patapsco River leading to the Harbor. This project led to the construction of what would later
become Fort McHenry, which became all the more important upon the beginning of the War of
1812. Baltimore was a target of a British attack because it was not only an important shipping
center, but it was also a haven for privateers who preyed on British ships. When the British
approached the city on September 13, 1814, Fort McHenry proved essential in defending the
Harbor during the Battle of Baltimore. 28
After the war, it was apparent that the lack of reliable defenses had hampered the fight
against the British. This was especially evident in the Royal Navy’s relative ease in sailing into
25

Id.
Act of March 16, 1802, ch. 9, §§ 26, 27, 2 Stat. 132, 137.
27
See US Army Corps of Engineers Brief History, http://www.hq.usace.army.mil/history/brief.htm#1beg (last
visited Jan. 4, 2008). See also Office of History, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, The History of the US Army
Corps of Engineers 25-27 (1998).
28
For a more detailed account of the Corps’ role in the construction of Fort McHenry and the Battle of Baltimore,
see H. Kanarek, The Mid-Atlantic Engineers: A History of the Baltimore District U.S. Corps of Engineers, 17741974 2-8 (1974).
26
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the Chesapeake Bay before the burning of Washington and the attack on Fort McHenry. The
Corps constructed fortifications at the mouth of the Bay near Hampton Roads and repaired Fort
McHenry. It also added more fortifications toward the mouth of the Patapsco River because Fort
McHenry was deemed too close to the inner harbor. One of the new defenses included Fort
Carroll.29 Brevet Col. Robert E. Lee, whom the Baltimore District of the Corps often calls its
first District Engineer, supervised the construction of this fort.30
The War of 1812 also demonstrated that an improved transportation system was essential
in defending against another invasion.31 The Corps thus became increasingly involved in civil
works projects, and its construction of land and water routes proved to be as beneficial for
commerce as it was for defense, especially in the push westward. Although there were many
calls for the Corps to be more involved in civil projects, there were weighty arguments against it,
especially the fear of unconstitutional federal intrusion into state matters.32 However, the U.S.
Supreme Court held otherwise in Gibbons v. Ogden:
[I]n regulating commerce with foreign nations, the power of Congress does not
stop at the jurisdictional lines of the several States. It would be a very useless
power, if it could not pass those lines. The commerce of the United States with
foreign nations, is that of the whole United States. Every district has a right to
participate in it. The deep streams which penetrate our country in every direction,
pass through the interior of almost every State in the Union, and furnish the
means of exercising this right. If Congress has the power to regulate it, that power
must be exercised whenever the subject exists. If it exists within the States, if a
foreign voyage may commence or terminate at a port within a State, then the
power of Congress may be exercised within a State.33
With this judicial stamp of approval, Congress passed the General Survey Act of 1824, which
authorized the president to survey roads and canals “of national importance, in a commercial or
29

Fort Carroll is now owned privately but abandoned. See A. Pietila, “No Plans Have Taken Wing at Old Fortress,”
Baltimore Sun, Aug. 2, 2004, at 1B.
30
For an account of the Corps’ defense installations around the Chesapeake Bay after the War of 1812 and Robert E.
Lee’s tenure with the Baltimore District, see Kanarek, supra note 28 at 27-33.
31
Office of History, supra note 27 at 37.
32
US Army Corps of Engineers Brief History, supra note 27.
33
22 U.S. 1, 195, 6 L.Ed. 23, 70 (1824).
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military point of view” and “to employ … such officers of the corps of engineers” to do so.34
One month later, Congress authorized the Corps to improve and remove obstructions to
navigation on the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers.35
Thereafter, there was no question as to the legitimacy of the federal government’s role in
the construction and improvement of the streams of interstate commerce. The Baltimore District
became involved in a flurry of civil projects, including the repair of the Cumberland Road, the
construction of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal and the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal, the
laying of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and the dredging of Baltimore Harbor.36
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, friction arose between the federal and state
governments over the obstruction of navigable bodies of water. State legislatures had
increasingly authorized obstructions such as railroad bridges and dams, and these state initiatives
often interfered with the federal government’s navigational improvement projects for rivers and
canals. The Corps proposed in 1877 that Congress enact legislation to prevent unauthorized
construction that obstructed harbor areas. This proposal became known as the “Dolph Bill,” and
it was introduced in Congress many times for more than a decade without success. Meanwhile,
the U.S. Supreme Court held in 1888 that the federal government could not stop state projects,
even if they obstructed navigation, without “a direct statute of the United States.”37 As a
response, Congress incorporated the Dolph Bill into a statute in 1890. Under this act, the
construction of any structure or the deposit of any refuse that obstructed a navigable body of
water required a permit issued from the Secretary of War, who would in turn delegate this
34

General Survey Act, ch. 46, 4 Stat. 22 (1824). See T. Shallat, Water and Bureaucracy: Origins of the Federal
Responsibility for Water Resources, 1787-1838, 32 Nat. Resources J. 5, 9 (1992) (describing the Act as “the most
critical piece of nineteenth century internal improvement legislation”).
35
Act of May 24, 1824, ch. 139, 4 Stat. 32 (1824). This Act was amended numerous times to extend to other rivers.
T. Shallat, supra note 34.
36
Baltimore District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, History of Baltimore Harbor and Channels,
http://www.nab.usace.army.mil/projects/Maryland/DMMP/history.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2008).
37
Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1, 8 S.Ct. 811, 31 L.Ed. 629 (1888).
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authority to the Corps.38 However, the 1890 Act encountered judicial resistance. Two federal
district cases held that Congress could not delegate to the Secretary of War such power to
regulate the construction of bridges across navigable waters.39 Congress then passed a
superseding act in 1899, requiring the approval of the Corps, and in some instances the approval
of Congress, for the construction of such structures.40
Today, the authority of the Corps of Engineers has expanded to include flood control,
hydroelectric power production, irrigation, and protection of water quality.41 Despite these
varied responsibilities, one of the greatest roles for the Corps remains the maintenance and
improvement of commercial waterways and ports. The Corps currently maintains more than
25,000 miles of navigation channels and about 400 ports, which requires dredging over 400
million cubic yards of spoil each year.42 The Baltimore District in particular has within its
jurisdiction the majority of the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries.

D. 50-Foot Harbor and Channel Dredging Plans
When Congress authorized deepening Baltimore Harbor and Channel to 42 feet in
1958,43 the House Public Works Committee sensed that a greater depth was necessary for the

38

Rivers and Harbors Act of 1890 §§ 6, 7, ch. 907, 26 Stat. 426, 453-454. See infra note 110.
United States v. Keokuk & H. Bridge Co., 45 F. 178 (S.D. Iowa 1891); United States v. Rider, 50 F. 406 (S.D.
Ohio 1892).
40
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 §§ 9, 10, 13 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403, 407 (2000)). For a more detailed
account of the history leading to this enactment, see D. Hankey, Sections 9 and 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act
of 1899: The Erosion of Administrative Control by Environmental Suits, 1980 Duke L.J. 170, 174-179; G. Power,
The Fox in the Chicken Coop: The Regulatory Program of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 63 Va. L. Rev.
503, 505-507 (1977). See also Brief of Appellants at 12-13, Hart & Miller Islands Area Environmental Group,
Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 621 F.2d 1281 (4th Cir. 1980) (Nos. 78-1911, 78-1912, 79-1037).
41
Power, supra note 5 at 5. See also John Paul Woodley, Asst. Sec. of the Army (Civil Works), Statement to U.S.
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Roles in the Nation’s
Water Resource Needs in the 21st Century (Mar. 31, 2004), available at http://epw.senate.gov/
hearing_statements.cfm?id=219879.
42
C. Kennedy, Presentation to 18th World Congress of Soil Science: History of Dredged Material and Usage in the
United States (Jul. 15, 2006), available at http://crops.confex.com/crops/wc2006/techprogram/P15531.HTM.
43
River and Harbor Act of 1958, Pub. L. 85-500, 72 Stat 297 (1958).
39

10

increasing drafts of ocean vessels.44 The committee directed the Corps to report on the
Chesapeake’s existing and future conditions. During the Baltimore District’s study of the issue,
it held several public hearings on the matter. All of the interested parties supported further
deepening of the channels to 45 feet, and some went further and requested a depth of 50 feet.45
These groups drew attention to the steadily increasing drafts of ocean vessels. The average draft
for tankers in 1946 was 35 feet, but this figure had risen considerably to 45 feet by 1966.46 The
Corps recommended further dredging, reporting to Congress in 1970 that although deepening the
channels to 50 feet would cost $72.7 million, the benefit-cost ratio was 2:1 in light of
Baltimore’s increasing trade.47
Congress acquiesced in 1970 and authorized deepening Baltimore Harbor and Channel to
50 feet, pending approval by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).48 However, OMB
requested that the Corps consider ways to cut costs, including, among others, dredging narrower
channels and convincing “the very few, easily identifiable immediate beneficiaries” to contribute
to the dredging effort.49 OMB also suggested deepening only the inbound portion of the channel
because the majority of vessels requiring 50 feet of clearance carried imports, and outbound
ships were usually not weighed down with cargo. Dredging only the inbound portion of the
channel was estimated to save $30 million.50
The Corps responded that the original plans remained most optimal. It stated that those
in favor of the dredging project found the proposed channel width sufficient, although there was

44

J. Arnold, The Baltimore Engineers and the Chesapeake Bay, 1961-1987 50 (1988).
Power, supra note 5 at 34 (“All comment was favorable and supported a new depth of at least 45 feet.”).
46
Id.
47
Arnold, supra note 44 at 50-51.
48
Maryland Institute for Policy Analysis and Research, University of Maryland, Baltimore County, A Project
Unresolved: Harbor Dredging and the Port of Baltimore 2 (Rev., Dec. 1983) (citing River and Harbor Act of
1970, § 101, Pub. L. 91-611, 84 Stat. 1818 (1970)).
49
Power, supra note 5 at 22.
50
Id.
45
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no comment on whether a narrower width would be acceptable.51 Regarding the suggestion to
share costs with private “beneficiaries,” the Corps noted that such a cost-sharing scheme was
unprecedented.52 Also, because of the large number of parties that would benefit from the
deeper channel, the cost-sharing scheme was deemed unnecessary, which might have been a
consequence of the deep opposition against this proposal from larger corporate beneficiaries like
Bethlehem Steel, Exxon, and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.53 Finally, the Corps flatly
rejected the recommendation to deepen only the inbound portion of the channel.54 OMB
ultimately granted approval in 1976.55

E. Issue of Spoil Disposal
There was a consensus in Maryland that deepening the Harbor and its approaches to 50
feet was essential to the economic health of the region.56 Groups concerned about the
environmental health of the Chesapeake Bay were satisfied with the Corps’ assessment that the
deepened channels would cause “relatively small” changes in the water’s currents and salinity
levels, and they conceded that the project would affect only those parts of the Bay that had
already been disturbed by dredging during the course of the previous 100 years.57 However, the
most worrisome issue turned out to be what to do with the spoil dredged from the project.

51

Id.
Id. at 23. This cost-sharing scheme was not totally unprecedented, as provided in the Rivers and Harbors Act of
1920 § 2, ch. 252, 41 Stat. 1010 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 547 (2000)) (“Every report submitted to
Congress in pursuance of any provision of law for a survey … shall contain … recommendations as to what local
cooperation shall be required.”). Id.
53
Id. at 23-24.
54
Id. at 23.
55
See Maryland Port Administration, supra note 3 at Appendix I.
56
“Just about everyone agrees that dredging the harbor is good—like the flag and motherhood.” D. Maraniss,
“ ‘Dredge or Die’: Mud Threatens the Port of Baltimore,” Washington Post, Jun. 3, 1979, at A1 (quoting John
Starr, geologist at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County).
57
Arnold, supra note 44 at 51.
52
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Deepening these waterways from 42 feet to 50 feet would generate about 52 million cubic yards
of spoil.58
In previous generations, spoil from dredging projects was simply dumped overboard into
open areas of the Bay.59 In the 1960s, conservationists decried such open-water disposal because
the bottom of Baltimore Harbor was contaminated from 100 years of chemical dumping.60 As a
result, the Maryland General Assembly in 1975 prohibited unconfined disposal of spoil from
Baltimore Harbor into the open waters of the Bay.61 Dredged spoil was then placed on onshore
tracts of land, but this proved to be unmanageable as available onshore land became scarcer.62 It
became apparent that another alternative was needed, especially as federal approval for the
dredging project was contingent on the state’s formulation of a proper disposal plan.63
Before Congress approved the 50-foot channel deepening project, the Maryland General
Assembly appropriated $13 million in 1969 to determine a proper dredge disposal site.64 The
engineering firms Green Associates and Trident Engineering Associates examined and evaluated
70 potential sites for spoil disposal, and it narrowed the field to five, which in order of preference
were: Hart and Miller Islands; Black Marsh; Six-Seven-Nine Mile Foot Knolls; Belvidere Shoal;
and Patapsco River Mouth.65 All five finalists involved the construction of a dike to contain
spoil from the channel dredging project.

58

Id. at 52; Power, supra note 5 at 26.
Maryland Port Administration, supra note 3 at 3.
60
Arnold, supra note 44 at 51.
61
Senate Bill No. 28 (1975).
62
Maryland Port Administration, supra note 3 at 4.
63
Power, supra note 5 at 25 (citing River and Harbor Act of 1970, § 101, Pub. L. 91-611, 84 Stat. 1818 (1970)).
64
1969 Md. Laws 1168.
65
Maryland Port Administration, supra note 3 at 18-22.
59
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F. Hart and Miller Islands
Along with neighboring Pleasure Island, Hart and Miller Islands were once joined
together as part of a peninsula as recently as 200 years ago, jutting into the Chesapeake Bay at
the mouth of the Back River. Sometime before 1846, the peninsula broke apart from the
mainland into two pieces, which became known as Hart and Miller Islands. Hart Island later
broke again between 1951 and 1952, and the smaller, southern portion was named Pleasure
Island.66
By the 1970s, Hart and Miller Islands were mainly wetlands, but there were also forests
on a significant portion of Hart Island. Although the islands were privately owned, many people
visited Hart Island’s sand beach in the summer months. There was also evidence of hunting67
and treasure seekers68 on Hart Island. The only significant development on the string of islands
was in the 1940s when George P. Mahoney and Col. A.T. Miller developed an amusement park
on Pleasure Island called New Bay Shore Park, which was accessible to the mainland by a 1,220foot wooden bridge.69 Mahoney had attempted to reverse rapid erosion of the island by

66

Id. at 29-31.
Baltimore District, U.S. Corps of Engineers, Environmental Statement: Permit Application for Diked Disposal
Island, Hart and Miller Islands, Baltimore County, Maryland Appendix B (Feb. 1976).
68
A legend tells of Joseph Hart, an Englishman who became wealthy by renting out land and operating a tavern in
Baltimore in the early nineteenth century. He did not deposit his money in banks because he distrusted them. He
was also wary of keeping money on his person or in his house because he had been robbed several times. It is
said that he buried about $15,000 worth of gold on the island before it broke into Hart and Pleasure Islands. See
D.C. Ruppert, The Treasure Trove of Hart Island, 1971; “Girl Fights State to Save ‘Treasure Island,’” Baltimore
Sun, Dec. 20, 1971, at C10; “New Yorker Plans to Buy Bay Islands,” Baltimore Sun, Aug. 5, 1933, at 10.
69
New Bay Shore Park included a roller coaster, concessions, beach, and even a casino. “Baltimoreans Flock to
New Bay Shore Park,” Baltimore (Magazine), July 1948. Mahoney intended to expand the amusement park’s
development into Hart and Miller Islands, but he never did so. He sold the park and the three islands to William
F. Chew in 1950 with the understanding that the park would continue in operation and expand into Hart and
Miller Islands, but Chew did not develop the two islands either. “Being Razed by Bethlehem Steel Co.: Bay
Shore Park Is Doomed,” Baltimore News-American, Dec. 29, 1964, at 2B; “Mahoney Sells Shore Park To
Dealer,” Baltimore Evening Sun, Apr. 28, 1950, at 42.
New Bay Shore Park was probably named after Bay Shore Park, which the United Railways and Electric
Company opened in 1906. Bay Shore Park was located on the mainland at the current site of North Point State
Park. Connected by trolley service from Baltimore, Bay Shore Park featured a bowling alley, restaurant, pier,
hotel, amusement park, gardens, beaches, and picnic grounds. It closed in 1947 when Bethlehem Steel purchased
the land and later methodically set fire to the buildings to clear land for a new plant, which was never constructed.
67
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constructing groins and emplacing 310,000 cubic yards of artificial fill, but all of the fill washed
away in a matter of years. The amusement park was later severely damaged by storms, and it
closed in 1964 after the bridge collapsed.70
Between 1846 and 1967, Hart Island had decreased from 264 acres in area to 94
(including the loss of 26 acres when Pleasure Island broke off). During the same period, Miller
Island shrank in area from 124 acres to 33 acres. Erosion was especially pronounced on the west
side of the islands facing Back River. Between 1933 and 1969, Hart and Miller Islands lost as
much as 3.4 feet of shoreline on their western sides. The islands were eroding so rapidly that the
Maryland Geological Survey had predicted that Pleasure Island would disappear by 1991, Hart
Island would disappear by 2045, and Miller Island would disappear by 2008.71 Thus, the Hart
and Miller Islands plan was not only to provide a satisfactory dredge disposal site, but it was also
to save the islands from washing away.
The most appealing attributes of the Hart and Miller Islands option were distance and
cost. The islands were only thirteen miles east of Baltimore City, and although this option was
not as cheap as open water disposal or on-land disposal, it was more economical than the
alternatives.72 On October 18, 1977, the state acquired the reversionary interest of Bethlehem

North Point State Park, Recreation and Wildlife Close to Baltimore, http://www.dnr.state.md.us/ baylinks/5.html
(last visited Jan. 4, 2008); R. Ruszin, Park Profile: North Point Visitor Center,
http://www.dnr.state.md.us/naturalresource/spring2003/parkprofile.html (2004); K. Brooks, Bay Shore Park:
1906-1947 (1992); F.J. Kreller, “Bay Shore Park Just A Memory, To Follow In Steps Of River View,” Baltimore
Evening Sun, Aug. 20, 1947, at 33; “Being Razed by Bethlehem Steel Co.,” supra.
70
A. Norden, Hart-Miller Island State Park: Creating a Unique Resource Out of Dredged Material (2004), available
at http://www.dnr.state.md.us/naturalresource/summer2004/hartmiller.html; Brooks, supra note 69; Maryland
Port Administration, supra note 3 at 29.
71
Maryland Port Administration, supra note 3 at 3. Pleasure Island, which was not a part of the diked disposal
project, still exists today
72
In 1979, open water disposal cost between $3.00 and $4.00 per cubic yard of dredged spoil, on-land disposal cost
$5.60 per cubic yard, and disposal at Hart-Miller Island was projected to cost $6.95 per cubic yard. Ocean
dumping cost $10.90 per cubic yard of dredged spoil, disposal on land via rail delivery was estimated to cost
$21.60 per cubic yard, and disposal on land via pipeline was estimated at $26.50 per cubic yard. Maryland Port
Administration, supra note 3 at 17. The most comparable alternative was an option for Black Marsh, which was
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Steel in Hart and Miller Islands.73 In 1978, the state purchased the two islands for $550,000
from C.J. Langenfelder and Sons, Inc., which held a long-term lease from Bethlehem Steel.74

G. Diked Disposal Area Plan
The plans for the diked enclosure at Hart and Miller Islands are essentially reflected in
the structure that exists today, which is much like an enormous container to hold the dredge
spoil.75 The islands serve as the northwestern wall of the enclosure so that the structure faces the
Chesapeake Bay to the east as “an irregular, oblong enclosure.” It measures approximately
12,430 feet by 4,700 feet, covering about 1,110 acres and originally planned to contain about 52
million cubic yards of sediment. The dike wall is constructed of sand deposits, although the wall
facing the Bay is riprapped with large stones to protect it from waves and currents. The walls are
built with a slope of 3:1 (1 foot of height for every 3 feet of horizontal distance) where there is
stone riprap, and where the dike faces dry land the slope is 5:1. Where the wall faces wetland, its
slope is 10:1. The two islands are connected together with an artificial beach.
The dredged material is delivered into the diked disposal area by hydraulic pipes from
either the dredge point itself or from barges. Because the dike wall is permeable, clear water will
filter into the bay after sedimentation. Sluice gates have also been constructed to prevent
overtopping. The strength of the structure was tested “in the field, and also the laboratory,” and
it was deemed “very safe.” The diked area is divided into two sections: the north cell

actually expected to cost less, but Hart and Miller Islands were projected to hold about 8 million cubic yards
more spoil. Id. at 21.
73
Maryland Port Administration, supra note 3 at Appendix.
74
“State Buys Hart And Miller Islands,” Baltimore Evening Sun, Feb. 6, 1978, at C24. In 1975, the state’s appraiser
had valued the land at $285,000 while C.J. Langenfelder and Sons, Inc. valued it at $1.1 million. Id. See also
“Owner Of Hart Miller Isles Asks Dike, Fill-In Permit,” Baltimore Evening Sun, Mar. 14, 1974, at F2. See also S.
McKerrow, “State Moves to Acquire Islands,” Baltimore Evening Sun, May 28, 1975, at F1.
75
The following descriptions of the Hart-Miller Island diked disposal area is gathered from Maryland Port
Administration, supra note 3 at 23-24, 32-34.
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(comprising 800 acres) and the south cell (comprising 300 acres). The only major deviation
between the original plan and actual construction is that while the height of the dike was
supposed to be 18 feet, it is now 28 feet at the south cell and 44 feet at the north cell.76
Upon selection of the site and development of plans, the state applied to the Corps of
Engineers in 1972 for a permit to construct the diked disposal area.77 The Rivers and Harbors
Act of 1899 § 10 required Corps approval for “any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by
Congress, to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States,”78 and the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 § 404 required Corps approval “for the discharge of
dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites.”79 During the permit
review process,80 the Department of Interior expressed concern about the possible elimination of
natural wetlands on the islands, and the Environmental Protection Agency criticized the project
as a short-term solution because there was no mention of what to do when Hart-Miller Island
became full.81 However, the state and private contractors involved in the project assured the
Corps that all environmental concerns were properly addressed, and the Corps approved the
application and granted a permit in 1976.82

H. Opposition
Although there were objections against the Hart-Miller Island project from such entities
as the Department of Interior and the Environmental Protection Agency, the fiercest opposition
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Norden, supra note 69.
Maryland State Department of General Services, Proposed Dredging and Dike in Chesapeake Bay at Hart and
Miller Island in Baltimore County, Maryland (Feb. 25, 1972).
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Codified at 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2000). See infra note 105.
79
Codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1976) (amended 1987).
80
For an extensive overview and critique of this permit review process during this time, see G. Power, supra note 40.
81
Baltimore District, U.S. Corps of Engineers, Final Environmental Statement: Permit Application for Diked
Disposal Island, Hart and Miller Island, Baltimore County, Maryland 94-96 (Feb. 1976).
82
Power, supra note 5 at 27; Department of the Army, Permit No. NABOP-F/2 (1976).
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came from residents along Back River, who likened their community to “a miniature Ocean
City.”83 These residents were forcefully backed by their elected representatives: U.S.
Representative Clarence D. Long, State Senator Norman R. Stone, and State Delegate Donald
Hutchinson. Perhaps the most vociferous among these officials was Congressman Long, who
held a Ph.D. in economics and was a member of the faculty at Johns Hopkins University.84 He
was a member of the Appropriations Committee, and he used this position to block funds for
dredging because of its link to dumping sludge into Hart and Miller Islands.85 Some even
accused him of holding as hostage the entire 50-foot channel deepening project until a site other
than Hart and Miller Islands was chosen for spoil disposal.86
Long based his opposition on environmental deterioration, including unpleasant odors,
the depletion of wildlife on land and under water, degradation of water quality, decrease of
property values, and even a possible failure of the dike.87 He even went as far as to declare that
the project was a result of class discrimination:
In any other part of the United States where there is a beautiful coastline, the
wealthy would be living there. But for some reason the working class settled on
the eastern coast of our county and never moved. That’s the only reason Hart and
Miller [were] considered for this project. People assumed they could dump on
the working class with impunity.
It just seems absurd to haul this spoil laden with mercury, cadmium and lead out
to a clean part of the bay and dump it there in a dike that could break and create a
dreary wasteland. In the valley they don’t understand why these people object.
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Ocean City is a vacation beachfront barrier island on the Atlantic Coast of southeastern Maryland. See M.
Olesker, “Millers Island: A Paradise in Jeopardy?” Baltimore News-American, Apr. 23, 1972, at 13-17. The
Back River residents confusingly referred to their community as Miller (or Millers) Island. “Miller Island is not
actually an island but a tip of the Patapsco River Neck area that reaches out in the bay. There is a real Miller
Island farther out in the bay, but it is not inhabited and is used only by fishermen.” L. Cedrone, “Residents Up In
Arms At Liquor Board Slur,” Baltimore Evening Sun, May 23, 1956.
84
Editorial, “Clarence Long,” Baltimore Sun, Sept. 20, 1994, at 10A.
85
A. Muscatine, supra note 18.
86
Power, supra note 5 at 37.
87
See Arnold, supra note 44 at 55.
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But if they proposed a dump in the valley, they’d come out with a battalion of
lawyers that could defeat the Russians.88
He also noted consistently that there was already a regional sewage disposal plant along the Back
River and that another community should shoulder the burden of spoil disposal.89
Long has been credited for blocking the construction of the diked disposal area and
deepening of the channels for more than ten years, which agitated people throughout Maryland
who were nervous about the potentially irrevocable blow against the economic health of the state.
As a result, he made bitter enemies who “usually [dipped] into a … profane bucket of adjectives”
to describe him, and his tactics led Governor Harry Hughes to declare in 1979 that it was time to
“dredge or die.”90 Long responded that he was merely representing his constituents’ interests,
and after he died in 1994, the Baltimore Sun acknowledged his “perfected” practice of
responding to their needs.91

III. Legal Challenge
A. Plaintiffs
When Representative Long failed to convince the Corps of Engineers to deny the state’s
permit application for the Hart-Miller Island project, he and a number of other parties filed suit
against the Corps in the federal District Court of Maryland on June 30, 1977. Long was
described in the complaint not only as a member of Congress representing the district affected by
the project, but also as “a private citizen who together with his family resides in Baltimore
County … and does use and enjoy the Chesapeake Bay and in particular the area in and around

88

Maraniss, supra note 56. The “valley” referred to wealthier areas in Baltimore County.
Arnold, supra note 44 at 55.
90
Maraniss, supra note 56.
91
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19

Hart and Miller Islands.”92 State Senator Norman Stone also described himself in this language,
adding that “[i]n his capacity as State Senator, he is opposed to the use and expenditure of State
funds for the proposed project and the desecration of State wetlands and waterways by an illconceived proposal.”93
Two environmental groups joined Long and Stone. The first was the Hart and Miller
Islands Area Environmental Group, Inc., which was organized in 1977 by residents along the
Back River. It claimed to have 400 members who “regularly and periodically visit, use, enjoy
and benefit from the Chesapeake Bay in general, and the area known as Hart and Miller Islands
in particular, including the waters around and adjacent to those Islands. Such use includes, but is
not limited to, fishing, boating, commercial shell fishing, commercial fishing, swimming, skiing,
sailing, photography, and picnicking.”94 The second environmental group was the Maryland
Wildlife Federation, Inc., an affiliate of the National Wildlife Federation whose “thousands” of
members were “interested in conserving and preserving wildlife, habitat and recreation areas in
that State.”95
Finally, there were six individually named plaintiffs whose properties were near Hart and
Miller Islands. They alleged that they would “suffer loss of benefit and enjoyment of their
properties, as well as a decrease in value caused by odors, dust, turbidity of water, loss of access
to affected waterways, and possible flooding caused by failure of the Dike.”96
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Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 3-4, Hart and Miller Islands Area Environmental
Group, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 459 F. Supp. 279 (D. Md. 1978) (No. HM77-973).
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Id. at 4.
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Id. at 3.
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Id. at 4.
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Id. at 4-5.
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B. Defendants
The U.S. Corps of Engineers and its various officials97 were the only named defendants
when the case was first filed. As the case progressed, the State of Maryland and the Steamship
Trade Association of Baltimore, Inc. (STA) were granted motions to intervene as defendants.
The State of Maryland sought to intervene as the main “proponent of the project” with various
agencies directly affected by it.98 The STA was “made up of steamship agents, owners, contract
stevedores, marine and terminal operators, affiliated service organizations, and other concerns
doing business in and around the Port of Baltimore.”99 It claimed standing because:
Neither the present Defendants nor the State of Maryland (which is also seeking
leave to intervene) will suffer the direct and substantial adverse economic effects
as will STA and its members if the Plaintiffs succeed in causing the Hart-Miller
disposal project to be delayed or cancelled… Any interference with such
dredging will cause ocean-going vessels to be diverted from Baltimore and will
result in a substantial loss of revenue to STA and its members.100
Although the STA successfully became a defendant party, its counsel did not seem to play an
active role in much of the litigation.101
The Chamber of Commerce of Metropolitan Baltimore also moved to intervene as a
defendant, claiming that it represented the interests of businesses that directly or indirectly
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The officials included: Clifford L. Alexander, Secretary of the Army; Lt. Gen. John W. Morris, Chief of
Engineers of the U.S. Army; and Col. G.K. Withers, District Engineer, Baltimore District, U.S. Corps of
Engineers. Id. at 5.
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depended on the trade at the Port of Baltimore.102 However, the District Court denied this
motion.

C. Summary of Procedural History
Plaintiffs filed eleven counts in their complaint against the defendants.103 All parties filed
cross motions for summary judgment on all issues, and the District Court granted summary
judgment to the plaintiffs based on the first count, declining to decide on the rest of the counts.
Defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which reversed. Writ of
certiorari to the Supreme Court was denied.104 The District Court then reviewed the remainder
of the eleven counts and held in favor of defendants, upon which construction of the Hart-Miller
Island diked disposal area was allowed to proceed. Plaintiffs did not appeal this final ruling.

D. First Count: Violation of Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899
1. Arguments
In their first count, plaintiffs alleged that the state had no authority to build the dike at
Hart-Miller Island even with the Corps’ permit under § 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of
1899.105 Instead, they argued that § 9 of the Act was controlling, which in pertinent part
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Motion of the Chamber of Commerce of Metropolitan Baltimore to Intervene as a Party Defendant, Hart and
Miller Islands Area Environmental Group, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 459 F. Supp. 279 (D. Md. 1978) (No.
HM77-973).
103
All eleven counts are detailed in Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief, supra note 92 at 1023.
104
449 U.S. 1003, 101 S.Ct. 544, 66 L.Ed.2d 300 (1980).
105
33 U.S.C. § 403 (2000), which in its entirety provides:
The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress, to the navigable
capacity of any of the waters of the United States is prohibited; and it shall not be lawful to build
or commence the building of any wharf, pier, dolphin, boom, weir, breakwater, bulkhead, jetty, or
other structures in any port, roadstead, haven, harbor, canal, navigable river, or other water of the
United States, outside established harbor lines, or where no harbor lines have been established,
except on plans recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the
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provided: “It shall not be lawful to construct or commence the construction of any … dike … in
any … navigable water of the United States until the consent of Congress to the building of such
structures shall have been obtained …”106
Plaintiffs urged that when considering what exactly constitutes a “dike,” it must be
construed from the plain meaning of the statute.107 They argued that because the Hart-Miller
Island project involved the construction of a dike in the Chesapeake Bay, which all parties
conceded was a navigable body of water that does not “lie wholly within the limits of a single
State,” the state was unauthorized to proceed with the project because there was no approval
from Congress. Furthermore, plaintiffs drew attention to the fact that the Corps and the State
themselves referred to the structure as a “dike” from the earliest stages of the project.108

Army; and it shall not be lawful to excavate or fill, or in any manner to alter or modify the course,
location, condition, or capacity of, any port, roadstead, haven, harbor, canal, lake, harbor of refuge,
or inclosure within the limits of any breakwater, or of the channel of any navigable water of the
United States, unless the work has been recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized
by the Secretary of the Army prior to beginning the same.
106

33 U.S.C. § 401 (2000), which in its entirety provides:
It shall not be lawful to construct or commence the construction of any bridge, dam, dike, or
causeway over or in any port, roadstead, haven, harbor, canal, navigable river, or other navigable
water of the United States until the consent of Congress to the building of such structures shall
have been obtained and until the plans for the same shall have been submitted to and approved by
the Chief of Engineers and by the Secretary of the Army: Provided, That such structures may be
built under authority of the legislature of a State across rivers and other waterways the navigable
portions of which lie wholly within the limits of a single State, provided the location and plans
thereof are submitted to and approved by the Chief of Engineers and by the Secretary of the Army
before construction is commenced: And provided further, That when plans for any bridge or other
structure have been approved by the Chief of Engineers and by the Secretary of the Army, it shall
not be lawful to deviate from such plans either before or after completion of the structure unless
the modification of said plans has previously been submitted to and received the approval of the
Chief of Engineers and of the Secretary of the Army.
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Group, Inc. v. U.S. Corps of Engineers 3-9, 459 F. Supp. 279 (D. Md. 1978) (No. HM77-973). See also Brief of
Appellees at 9, Hart & Miller Islands Environmental Group, Inc. v. U.S. Corps of Engineers, 621 F.2d 1281 (4th
Cir. 1980) (Nos. 78-1911, 78-1912, 79-1037).
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Defendants countered that the legislative history and eighty years of the Corps’ execution
of the Act showed the need for Congressional consent only for structures resulting in the
“blocking of an interstate navigable waterway by spanning that waterway.”109 They noted that
the original enactment110 called for the Secretary of War to approve construction of all bridges
and other such structures over navigable waters.111 This statute was amended in 1892, but the
most pertinent language remained the same: the construction of “any bridge, bridge draw, bridge
piers and abutments, causeway, or other works over or in any … navigable waters of the United
States” required the approval of the Secretary of War.112 Defendants observed that all of the
structures listed in the 1890 and 1892 acts completely spanned waterways. When § 7 of the 1892
Act was moved to § 9 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, terms designating “parts” of
bridges were deleted (i.e. bridge piers and bridge draws), and they were replaced by the words
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Motion for Summary Judgment at 8-16, Hart & Miller Islands Environmental Group, Inc. v. U.S. Corps of
Engineers 3-9, 459 F. Supp. 279 (D. Md. 1978) (No. HM77-973); Brief of Appellants at 9, Hart & Miller Islands
Environmental Group, Inc. v. U.S. Corps of Engineers, 621 F.2d 1281 (4th Cir. 1980) (Nos. 78-1911, 78-1912,
79-1037).
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Rivers and Harbors Act of 1890 § 7, ch. 907, 26 Stat. 426, 454, which in its entirety provided:
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any act of the legislative assembly of any State, until the location and plan of such bridge or other
works have been submitted to and approved by the Secretary of War, or to excavate or fill, or in
any manner to alter or modify the course, location, condition, or capacity of the channel of said
navigable water of the United States, unless approved and authorized by the Secretary of War:
Provided, That this section shall not apply to any bridge, bridge-draw, bridge piers and abutments
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(Emphasis added.)
Motion for Summary Judgment at 11, supra note 109; Brief of Appellants, supra note 109 at 13.
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“dike” and “dam.”113 Under the rule of ejusdem generic,114 defendants concluded that
Congressional approval115 should be needed only for the class of structures that completely span
a navigable waterway.116 Thus, defendants concluded that there was no need for Congressional
approval of the Hart-Miller Island project because it did not completely span a waterway

2. Analysis and Decision of District Court
The district court approached the issue in two steps. It first attempted to decide whether
the Hart-Miller Island structure constituted a dike “within the meaning of Section 9,” and if the
structure were indeed a dike, whether it was to be placed “over or in any … navigable water of
the United States.”117 The court approached the inquiries by analyzing the case law, the
legislative history, and the Corps’ past administrative practice regarding the Act in question.
The court began the analysis by reviewing three other federal district court cases. The
first involved the use of artificial fill to extend the eastern shore of Manhattan further into the
Hudson River for the construction of an expressway.118 The Corps had granted a § 10 permit for
the construction of a wall to separate the fill from the river, but plaintiffs contended that such a
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Motion for Summary Judgment at 12, supra note 109; Brief of Appellants at 15, supra note 109.
Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) defines “ejusdem generic” as:
A canon of construction that when a general word or phrase follows a list of specifics, the general
word or phrase will be interpreted to include only items of the same type as those listed. • For
example, in the phrase horses, cattle, sheep, pigs, goats, or any other farm animal, the general
language or any other farm animal -- despite its seeming breadth -- would probably be held to
include only four-legged, hoofed mammals typically found on farms, and thus would exclude
chickens.
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supra note 40 at 21.
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See infra note 128.
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Citizens Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff’d, 425 F.2d 97 (2d
Cir. 1970). About 9.5 million cubic yards of fill were to extend as much as 1,300 feet into the river.
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project required a § 9 permit because the structure was a dike to be built “in or over” a navigable
river. The district court in Hudson Valley observed that the permit, plans, and construction bids
for the project all contained references to a “dike.” Defendants in that case argued that the term
“dike” held a different meaning from the ordinary use of the term, stating that the term as used in
the 1899 Act meant: “a wall or embankment of timber, stone, concrete, fascines, or other
material, built as a training works for a river so as rigidly to confine flow within definite limits
over the length treated.”119 According to this definition, the Corps contended that a “dike” for
the purposes of § 9 must “substantially affect navigation.” Nevertheless, the district court
concluded that the Corps’ reference to the project as a “dike” was enough to make it so, and
Congressional consent was thus required for this expressway project. “Statutes are to be
construed by attributing its ordinary meaning to the language used. … [I]f Congress meant to
confine its jurisdiction to only those dikes that substantially affect navigation, it would have said
so.”120 Defendants appealed this judgment, but the Second Circuit affirmed.
Next, there was a case that involved the extension of an airport runway into the Columbia
River.121 This project involved the removal of islands in the river to create fill for the runway,
for which the Corps granted a permit under § 10. The court in that case observed that the
removal of islands would actually improve navigability. It further stated that the Corps provided
sufficient legislative history to show that the 1899 Act was a response to the need for keeping
navigable bodies of water clear from obstructions. Thus, § 9 requires the consent of Congress
only when there is obstruction to navigation, and labeling a structure a dike does not necessarily
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make it so for the purposes of § 9.122 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit remanded, directing the lower
court to vacate the case as moot because the plan to extend the airport runway had by that time
been abandoned. Thus, the district court in Hart & Miller Islands considered this case only as an
advisory opinion.123
The last district court case involved a canal that was deemed to constitute a dike under §
9.124 The matter arose from a § 10 permit to build a canal across a river so that the river would
be dammed. That court adopted the “ordinary meaning” standard from Hudson Valley for
determining whether a structure is a dike under § 9. The canal was indeed a “barrier preventing
the flow of water” that was “in” a navigable river.125
The Hart & Miller Islands court then turned its attention to two Supreme Court cases.
Without describing the facts of those cases, the court provided excerpts from those opinions that
apparently supported the view that the intent of Congress was indeed to include a “dike” under
the purview of § 9 as it is ordinarily defined.126
Observing that numerous documents referred to the Hart-Miller Island project as a “dike”
and that “the whole purpose of the structure is to hold back the waters of the bay from intrusion
into the area in which the dredged spoil will be placed,” the district court held that the structure
is indeed a “dike” under § 9. Furthermore, the court held that the Corps’ view that a “dike”
requires Congressional only if it completely spans a navigable waterway was incorrect. Citing
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Petterson, 331 F. Supp. at 1306. The district court in Petterson noted that the Corps’ explanation of the
legislative history was beyond what was provided in the Hudson Valley case. Id. However, the district court in
Hart & Miller Islands criticized the Petterson court for not illustrating exactly how the Corps argued the
legislative history. 459 F. Supp. at 285. But see Hankey, supra note 40 (“The Hart & Miller court itself declined
to seek any guidance from the history of either the 1890 Act or the 1899 Act.”).
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Id. at 626-627.
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States v. Arizona, 295 U.S. 174, 55 S.Ct. 666, 79 L.Ed. 1371 (1935))
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another Supreme Court case,127 the court found that the terms “any obstruction” in § 10 “must be
given a broad sweep.” Thus, the Corps’ regulation128 that a dike is a structure that completely
spans a navigable waterway for the purposes of section 9 was deemed beyond the reach of its
authority. The language of the Act was very clear that Congressional approval was needed for a
dike “over or in … any navigable water.” Because the Hart-Miller Island structure was to be
“in” the Chesapeake Bay, a navigable water, the district court ruled that the project needed the
consent of Congress under § 9.129 Defendants appealed this decision.

3. Analysis and Decision of the Circuit Court
The Fourth Circuit began its analysis by accepting the contention that since the adoption
of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, the Corps had interpreted § 9 as requiring the consent of
Congress only for structures that completely span a navigable body of water.130 Interestingly, the
court supported this point by citing the same excerpt from Wisconsin v. Illinois that the district
court had cited in its decision against the Corps. However, the circuit court cited two additional
paragraphs from the case that the district court had ignored, which stated in part: “The
construction of Section 10 is sustained by the uniform practice of the War Department for nearly
thirty years. Nothing is more convincing in interpretation of a doubtful or ambiguous statute. …
The Secretary of War acted on this view … about two months after the passage of the Act.”131
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United States v. United States Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 80 S.Ct. 884, 4 L.Ed.2d 903 (1960), rehearing
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The court then turned to the same three federal district cases that the district court had
reviewed: Hudson Valley, Petterson, and Sierra Club. The circuit court considered the Corps’
argument that there was insufficient legislative and administrative history provided for a proper
judgment in Hudson Valley. The court also noted that the Petterson case had become moot, but
it made no mention of the need to consider this case only as an advisory opinion as the district
court had done.132 Finally, the court characterized the canal in Sierra Club as a dike under § 9
because it “would cross and completely dam and obstruct a navigable river,”133 which differed
from the conclusion that the canal was a dike because it fit the term’s ordinary meaning and was
“in” a navigable river.134
The circuit court looked at one additional case: Citizens Committee for Environmental
Protection v. U.S. Coast Guard,135 which resembled the Hudson Valley case in that it involved
the use of fill to construct a highway extension. The Citizens Committee court rejected the
contention that the fill was a dike because its impact on navigation was “negligible,” ruling that
the Corps acted properly in granting a § 10 permit.
Unable to extract a plain meaning of dikes from the case law, the circuit court then turned
to legislative history. The circuit court recounted a confusing string of events leading to the
enactment of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, which was supposed to be a mere
recodification of the 1890 Act. In short, Congress enacted the 1899 Act “without carefully
examining its provisions, on the strength of representations that the Act made no significant
change in existing law.”136 Paralleling the arguments of the Corps,137 the circuit court found that
132

See supra note 123.
621 F.2d at 1286.
134
See supra note 120.
135
456 F. Supp. 101 (D. N.J. 1978)
136
621 F.2d at 1287-88. For another account of how Congress was “deceived” in the passage of the 1899 Act, see
Hankey, supra note 40 at 180-181.
137
See supra nn. 109-116.
133

29

the original enactment, § 7 of the 1890 Act,138 provided for the approval of the Secretary of War
for “any bridge, bridge-draw, bridge piers and abutments, causeway or other works over or in
any … navigable waters.” The amendments in sections 9 and 10 of the 1899 Act to require the
approval of Congress for certain structures were apparently in response to the Keokuk and Rider
decisions.139 The circuit court observed that Keokuk and Rider both involved the issuance of
permits for bridges that completely span a river, and it also saw that section 9 of the 1890 Act
replaced terms for parts of bridges with “dams” and “dikes”:
In all events, this is a perfectly reasonable construction of the statutes, and it has
been so construed by the Corps since its passage. Taking the view of the
structures listed in Section 9 of the 1899 Act, two are works which, by definition,
span waterways (bridges and dams). Dikes as used in that section, according to
this construction, should be interpreted to include only dikes that span
waterways.140
The circuit court continued by citing various officials in support of deference to the Corps
in its interpretation of § 9,141 including Congressional testimony by Secretary of War Lindsley M.
Garrison in 1916142 and a lecture to army engineers in 1926143. The court also quoted an
affidavit from the Chief of the Miscellaneous Civil Branch of the Corps of Engineers:
It has been my interpretation and that followed by my predecessors in office, that
the term “dike” and “causeway” as used in Section 9 of the Rivers and Harbors
Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. 401, refer to a structure which results in the closure of a
navigable waterway by extending completely across same so as to block
navigation if no provision is made for its passage.144
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Plaintiffs argued that all of these statements were merely opinions of individuals who had
no proof of such application of § 9,145 but the court remarked that the Corps had “special
familiarity” with the 1899 Act, which it had drafted.146 Finally, the court turned its attention to
the fact that while deliberating over the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, “Congress was not
only aware of, but approved and encouraged the Corps’ practice of issuing permits for diked
disposal areas, without specific Congressional approval.”147 Thus, the court concluded that the
Hart-Miller Island project was not a dike under § 9 of the 1899 Act, and Congressional approval
for its construction was unnecessary. The Corps acted properly by granting the state a § 10
permit.

E. Remaining Counts
Upon the circuit court’s reversal of the first count, the case returned to the district court
for a judgment on the remaining ten counts. The district court began its analysis by reviewing
the sixth count,148 which alleged that the Corps had failed to comply with its own regulations
requiring federal, state, and/or local authorization before granting the permit for Hart-Miller
Island.149 Plaintiffs believed that the Corps had not complied with state statutes requiring
approval from the state Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene to operate a “landfill refuse
disposal system,” compliance with zoning and land use requirements, and approval of the
county’s legislative body.150 It was noted that “the County Council of Baltimore County has
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gone on record on several occasions with resolutions stating their opposition to the Hart and
Miller Island facility.”151 Plaintiffs added that the project involved a “landfill refuse disposal
system” because it involved the dumping of industrial waste from Baltimore Harbor and the
placement of that waste on the surface of parts of Hart and Miller Islands.
The court looked to the definition of “solid waste acceptance facility” in other sections of
the Maryland Code and North Carolina’s definition of a “sanitary landfill,” contrasting it with
the Corps’ description of the diked disposal area. It then accepted the affidavit of the official
responsible for the enforcement of the statutes in question. This official stated that a diked
disposal area was not construed to be a solid waste acceptance facility.152 The court also looked
at the statutes’ legislative history, which had been amended to include a “sludge composting
facility” among the projects needing approval from the Department of Health and Mental
Hygiene. This amendment occurred in 1979, which was before the Corps’ approval of the HartMiller Island project, and this demonstrated that the state legislature knew that the statute prior to
the amendment did not apply to the project.153 The court sided with defendants and held that the
diked disposal area did not constitute a landfill requiring state approval.
Plaintiffs also claimed within the sixth count that because Hart and Miller Islands were
zoned for agricultural use, the Corps had failed to obtain a zoning exception from Baltimore
County. However, the court cited a Maryland Court of Appeals decision holding that the state
was not subject to a county or city’s zoning ordinances because the state itself had granted such
authority. “[I]t is a long-standing principle of statutory construction that the State is not deemed
to be bound by an enactment of the General Assembly unless the enactment specifically names
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the State or manifests a clear intention that the State is to be bound…”154 Thus, the court granted
summary judgment to the defendants on the sixth count.
The rest of the counts rested primarily on the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA),155 which provided in relevant part that when federal agencies are involved in major
actions “significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,” they must include a
detailed statement on the environmental impact of the action, alternatives to the proposed action,
the relationship between local short-term, and any “irreversible and irretrievable
commitments of resources.”156 The court prefaced the review of these counts by stating: “[I]t is
clear that in cases brought pursuant to NEPA, this court’s role is limited and its scope of review
is narrow[.]”157 The court sorted the remainder of the counts into five categories and analyzed
them in the following order: possible construction failures, alternatives, adverse and cumulative
environmental effects, abuse of discretion, and bad faith.
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Concerning possible construction failures, plaintiffs based their arguments on the Rivers
and Harbors Act of 1899 § 10,158 which defendants conceded required rigorous examination of
structures to be constructed in navigable waters, and NEPA, which required the Corps to address
possible construction failures. The court summarized plaintiffs’ allegations against defendants as:
“failure to complete once started, failure or inability to close the dike, failure to hold spoil,
failure to retain pollutants, and any other breaching of the dike.”159 It then stated again that the
court’s scope of review was narrow once an agency made a decision pursuant to NEPA. In this
light, the court dismissed most of the allegations because it ruled that the Corps had considered
the possible failures that the plaintiffs feared. “Consideration of the issues is all that this court
can properly require of the Corps[.]”160 The court added that it “cannot substitute its judgment
for that of the Corps of Engineers nor determine who among competing experts presents the
most reliable information or reaches the most correct conclusions.”161 As for other possible
failures, the court found that the plaintiffs had presented no evidence that they would occur. “In
the absence of evidence that a contrary result is likely to ensue, plaintiffs’ suggested failures
must be deemed purely speculative, and the [Environmental Impact Statement] cannot be faulted
for failure to discuss them.”162
The court then turned to the counts related to the absence of considering alternative
projects. Plaintiffs urged that the Corps’ review of the project was “in such a cursory manner …
to the extent that it is arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion”163 and that the Corps did
not consider the relative cost of Hart-Miller Island compared to alternative projects.164 The court
158
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first established that the requirement of considering alternatives under NEPA was subject to a
“rule of reason.”165 After considering the Corps’ various studies on the matter, including the
Trident-Green report that reviewed seventy different options,166 the court stated:
The real thrust behind plaintiffs’ assertions of failure to consider alternatives is
that the Corps was wrong in selecting the Hart and Miller Islands site as the most
favorable for the dike project. … [P]laintiffs misconceive the role of the court. …
Upon ascertaining that alternatives to the proposed project were given reasonable
consideration by the Corps, this court has completed its task[.]”167
Defendants’ motions for summary judgments on these counts were granted.
Regarding the counts regarding adverse and cumulative environmental effects from the
diked disposal area, the court again raised the “rule of reason” standard, stating that the Corps’
environmental impact statement “need not be exhaustive to the point of discussing all possible
details bearing on the proposed action[.]”168 Thus, the plaintiffs’ arguments about adverse
effects from dredging to allow an access channel to Hart-Miller Island, expansion of the diked
disposal area, or the disturbance of wildlife were all found to be lacking because there was no
certainty about executing these plans. These concerns were either speculative or sufficiently
addressed by the Corps, which was all that was necessary under the “rule of reason.”
There was one count alleging abuse of discretion that relied on a federal statute. The
statute provided that a reviewing court must set aside agency actions that are, among other things,
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law.”169
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Plaintiffs presented an undated memorandum from the Chief Counsel of the Army Corps of
Engineers that expressed doubts about the legal strength of the § 10 permit for the Hart-Miller
Island project.170 However, the court reasoned that it had already found in the analysis of the
previous counts that the Corps’ actions were not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion,
and the legal reasoning of the memorandum was persuasive at best.
Finally, the court reviewed plaintiffs’ allegation that the Corps had engaged in bad faith
in two regards: the Corps had withheld information from the Department of the Interior in order
to gain its approval; and the Corps had “malign[ed] the character and reputation of those in
opposition to the Dike.”171 The court remarked that there was no evidence to support either
claim. It further observed that the Corps had allowed the Interior Department to review and
comment upon the plans from an early stage, and the Corps had also elicited feedback from those
opposed to the project through public fora and acceptance of written complaints. Citing Rule
56(e),172 the court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on these counts.

(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be–
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this
title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the
reviewing court.
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of
it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.
170
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With summary judgments in their favor on all counts, defendants were able to proceed
with the Hart-Miller Island project. Plaintiffs did not appeal this decision. After having spent
$20,000 for this lawsuit, they were unable to raise $5,000 more for the appeal.173

IV. Construction of Hart-Miller Island
The lawsuit caused a delay not only in the construction of the diked disposal area, but it
also prevented dredging for the channel deepening project because there was nowhere to place
the spoil. By the time that the legal dispute ended in December 1980, about five years had
passed since the Corps granted the § 10 permit for Hart-Miller Island, and ten years had passed
since Congressional approval of deepening the channels from 42 to 50 feet.
Construction of the diked disposal area began in 1981 and was completed in 1983.
However, the channel deepening project continued to stall because President Ronald Reagan had
by that time cut back on federal spending and had pushed for local governments to shoulder
more of the financial burden for such projects.174 Senator Charles Mathias Jr. (R-Md.) was able
to include the channel deepening project in a water projects bill that Congress passed in October
1984, but Reagan vetoed it.175 After another two years, the state and Corps of Engineers agreed
in 1986 that the state would pay about 40% of the costs, which had decreased from $326 million
to $242 million after various cost-saving measures, including narrowing the planned widths of
the channels.176 The agreement was included in the Water Resource Development Act of
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1986,177 and President Reagan approved the bill on November 17, 1986.178 The dredging project
began on June 2, 1987.179

V. Dredging and Hart-Miller Island Today
Although the 50-foot channel deepening projects have long been completed, Hart-Miller
Island continues to receive spoil. Dredging continues in the channels because sediments
constantly settle on the floor of the Chesapeake Bay. Every year, 4 million cubic yards of spoil
is removed to maintain the channels’ 50-foot depth.180 In this regard, the Port of Baltimore and
its channels require more maintenance than any other in the country.181
Because there was no other repository for the spoil until 1999, the state raised the walls
of the Hart-Miller Island dike from their original 18 feet to 28 feet in 1988, much to the dismay
of nearby residents. At the time, members of the state General Assembly promised “never
again” to raise the dike walls. However, the state broke this promise when it decided to raise the
walls of the North Cell to 44 feet in 1996. This increase in height allowed another 30 million
cubic yards to be stored in the diked disposal area, which was estimated to lengthen its life by
twelve years.182 The state’s arguments for this broken promise echoed those made in favor of the
project in the 1970s: it was imperative to maintain deep channels in order to keep the Port of
Baltimore alive, which in turn supported tens of thousands of Marylanders. To placate the
177
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residents’ anger about this development, the state reportedly “compensated” Baltimore County
$8 million to be used for area schools and other projects.183
The North Cell of the island was projected to close in 2009, so the state began looking for
other disposal sites. It hoped to use two locations: Poplar Island on the north end of the
Chesapeake Bay, and an area called Site 104 for open-water dumping near Kent Island and the
Bay Bridge. Site 104 was clearly the more financially cost-effective choice at between $1 and
$4 for disposal of each cubic yard compared to $11 for Poplar Island.184 However, Site 104 was
disapproved when it was found that toxins in the dredge spoil would harm the Bay’s ecosystem if
it were dumped in open waters.185 The plans for Poplar Island were authorized, and it was
expected to receive 30 million cubic yards in total over twenty years, after which the island
would be converted into 1,100 acres of wildlife refuge.186
Today, the South Cell of Hart-Miller Island is a popular state park for boating, camping,
and fishing with 3,000 feet of sandy beaches.187 It is also restored for a wildlife habitat, which
the National Audubon Society includes on its list of Important Bird Areas.188
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VI. Conclusion
It is indeed ironic that the Hart-Miller Island opponents’ gloomy forecast of dike failures
not only failed to transpire, but an environmentally-friendly park appears to be emerging. Of
course, this is not to say that an environmentally hazardous accident will certainly not occur in
the future. As one resident stated, “They said the Titanic wouldn’t sink either.”189
These residents faced the difficult task of convincing the public that the Hart-Miller
Island project would adversely affect a large geographic area when it was apparent that they
were narrowly concerned about their own community. Very few people outside their community
noticed their plight. The few who noticed their plight probably ignored them because they did
not want to assume such a dredge spoil project near their own homes. In the courts, the
plaintiffs’ strongest legal arguments relied on obscure language from a nineteenth-century statute
and an environmental act that granted low-level scrutiny to the federal government. As one
writer noted, “From the beginning, it was a losing battle.”190 And to add insult to injury, the
residents got little, if anything, in return for having to live with the diked disposal area beyond
their backyards.
However, it was a losing battle for the other side as well. While the environmentalists
faced a formidable foe in economic necessity, the state found a formidable foe in
“NIMBYism.”191 Although the state successfully dredged the 50-foot shipping lanes and
purportedly saved the Port of Baltimore, it turned out that the residents cost the state a decade
and millions of dollars because of the delay in deepening the shipping channels.
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When there is a standoff over large public works projects, both environmentalists and
governmental entities must look beyond the mere success or failure of litigation when calculating
their costs. Environmentalists must realize that they often fight losing battles, but perhaps they
can extract large concessions or “compensation”192 from the state for accepting a large project.
State and local governments, on the other hand, might find it beneficial to consider providing
such concessions or compensation to environmentalists and NIMBY activists. In the Hart and
Miller Islands controversy, the state might have used the money that it ended up spending in the
courts and negotiating with the Reagan administration to win over the Back River residents.
Even if the state did not end up saving money this way, it would have saved ten years in
dredging the 50-foot channels to the Port of Baltimore. In this light, it is imperative that
governmental authorities include the costs of delays from litigation when planning for large
projects in general and defending against lawsuits in particular.
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Appendix

Mud machine from late eighteenth century.
R. Keith, Baltimore Harbor: A Pictorial History 218 (3d ed. 1991).

42

